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Records and Archives in Court 
by A.F. SHEPPARD* 
Some commentary might be made on the excellent papers by Mark Hopkins 
and Kenneth Chasse which appeared in Archivaria 18. The topic which both 
authors addressed, to cite the ACA 1983 programme, was as follows: 
In an increasingly litigious society, records and archives frequently 
become evidence in court. What are the criteria for admitting records 
in court as evidence, and how might records keepers be called upon 
to testify in court? These matters will be discussed in the context 
of federal and provincial law. 
Therefore, my comments are directed towards these two central issues: the 
criteria for admitting records in court as evidence, and the status of records 
keepers called upon to testify in court. 
I. The criteria for admitting records in court as evidence 
Whenever a litigant proposes to use a record as evidence in court, three rules 
of evidence must be satisfied. As Mark Hopkins and Kenneth Chasse point out 
so lucidly, computer technology has created new forms of records which are 
often in machine language that must be read by an expert or converted to English 
before a court can use them as evidence. Computers can also dispense with 
written records entirely. As the use of computers becomes more widespread and 
the technology changes, the courts will face more evidentiary issues. The objec- 
tions to the admissibility in court of computer printouts are the same ones that 
apply to any record. These three objections or criteria are exclusionary rules 
of law. 
In a trial, with or without a jury, the judge must decide whether the rules 
of admissibility have been satisfied. These three rules of law are authentica- 
tion, best evidence, and hearsay. 
(A) Authentication: Whenever a record is used in court, the party offering it 
into evidence must introduce some evidence that it is genuine. When 
computer-generated records are offered, they must be authenticated. 
* These remarks are adapted from my commentary on the two authors' papers which 1 presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Canadian Archivists in Vancouver in June 1983. 
0 All rights reserved: Archivaria 19 (Winter 1984-85) 
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Kenneth Chasse's paper is largely concerned with the authentication of 
computer records. The genuineness of a computer record is shown by prov- 
ing the reliability of the particular computer used, and the dependability 
of the procedures to operate it and obtain the printout offered in court. 
An authenticating witness must also identify the printout as from the 
computer. If the printout is unintelligible to the judge and jury, an expert 
must explain it to them after it is introduced into evidence. In R. v. 
McMullen,' Morden, J.A., for the Ontario Court of Appeal, described the 
special concern about the authentication of computer printouts as reliability: 
I accept that the demonstration of reliability of computer 
evidence is a more complex process than proving the reliability 
of written records. I further accept that as a matter of principle 
a Court should carefully scrutinize the foundation put before 
it to support a finding of reliability, as a condition of admissi- 
bility. . . . The nature and quality of the evidence put before 
the Court has to reflect the facts of the complete record keeping 
process - in the case of computer records, the procedures and 
processes relating to the input of entries, storage of information, 
and its retrieval and presentation. . . . 
As long as there is enough evidence of reliability that a reasonable jury 
properly instructed could find that the record is what it is purported to be, 
the judge should admit the printout as authenticated. A judge should not 
weigh contradictory evidence on the issue of authenticity. If the opponent 
has evidence that the printout is unreliable, the judge should not hear it 
on the issue of authenticity. The judge should assume that the evidence in 
favour of authenticity is uncontradicted. The opponent's contradictory 
evidence would go to the weight to be given to the printout by the jury (or 
the judge, in a trial by judge alone). The distinction between admissibility 
and weight is discussed at the end of this paper. 
( B )  The Best Evidence Rule: If the parties to the litigation dispute the contents 
of a record, the party offering it into evidence must introduce the original 
or a duplicate. Failing that, the party must satisfy the court that the original 
is unavailable. Then the party can prove contents of the record by second- 
ary evidence such as a copy or oral testimony. Only if the party can account 
for the absence of the primary evidence will secondary evidence be admis- 
sible to prove its contents. A computer printout or microfilm seems readily 
admissible in evidence, over the objection that it violates the best evidence 
rule. 
1 .  Computer printout 
The Alberta2 and Ontario Courts of Appeal3 have held that a 
computer printout is an original record and not a copy of the informa- 
tion stored in the computer. Bill S-33, the proposed Canada Evidence 
Act,  s. 130, provides that a printout is an original. 
1 R. v .  McMuNen (1979) 47 C.C.C. (2d) 499, at p. 506. 
2 R. v .  CordeN (1982) 39 A.R. 281 (A1ta.C.A.). 
3 R. v .  Bell and Bruce (1982) 35 O.R. (2d) 164 (C.A.). 
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2. Micro film 
Many federal and provincial statutory provisions affect the applica- 
tion of the best evidence rule to  microfilm^.^ Bill S-33, the proposed 
Canada Evidence Act, ss. 130 and 132, would make microfilm admis- 
sible as duplicates. Where a statute provides that a microfilm is admis- 
sible "for all purposes," the courts apply the words literally. In Kushner 
Breen & Gordon v. MerriN L y n ~ h , ~  it was held that a microfilm copy 
of a person's handwriting could be used as a standard of comparison 
to determine whether that person also wrote the document in issue. The 
handwriting expert testified that he would not have taken the job if 
he had known that a microfilm was the standard. The judge admitted 
the expert's opinion as to the identity of the disputed handwriting, but 
gave it no weight. 
Even in the absence of specific legislation, the courts admit micro- 
film as original evidence. For example, in Barker v. Wilson16 the 
English High Court, Queen's Bench Division, held that if microfilm 
is the method used by a business in keeping permanent records, then 
it is admissible as an original record. Bridge, L.J., said: 
The Bankers' Books Evidence Act 1879 was enacted with 
the practice of bankers in 1879 in mind. It must be construed 
in 1980 in relation to the practice of bankers as we now 
understand it. So construing the definition of 'banker's 
books' and the phrase 'an entry in a banker's book,' it seems 
to me that clearly both phrases are apt to include any form 
of permanent record kept by the bank of transactions relat- 
ing to the bank's business, made by any of the methods 
which modern technology makes available, including, in 
particular, microfilm.' 
(C) The Hearsay Rule 
Hearsay in the law of evidence means any oral or written statement "offered 
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted but made otherwise 
than in testimony at the proceeding in which it is offered."* The elements 
of hearsay are, first, a statement which was not made under oath and subject 
to cross-examination in this proceeding, and secondly, the statement is 
offered as evidence to prove the truth of what it asserts. If the statement 
does not violate the hearsay rule, it is called non-hearsay. But if the state- 
ment violates the definition of hearsay, the judge can receive it in evidence 
only if it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule. 
4 See for example Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C.  1970, c .  E-10, s. 31; Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 
1979 c .  116 s. 40. 
5 [I9741 3 W.W.R. 158 (Man.Q.B.). 
6 [I9801 2 All E.R. 8 1 (Eng.Q.B.Div.); R. v. Biasi et al. (I98 1) 62 C.C.C. (2d) 304 (B.C.S.C., 
photostats used as originals held admissible). 
7 Ibid., at p. 83. 
8 Bill S-33, the Canada Evidence Act, 1982, s. 2 .  
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Computer-generated and microfilm evidence seem, once again, to be read- 
ily admissible over a hearsay objection on the ground either that it is not 
hearsay or that it is hearsay but saved by an exception. 
1. Computer printout 
(a) Non-hearsay 
A computer printout may be admissible as non-hearsay. In R. v. 
W ~ o d , ~  the accused was charged with possession of stolen metal. The 
Crown experts used a computer to calculate the chemical composition 
of the metal. They testified as to the chemical analysis and the computer 
programme. The English Court of Appeal held that the printout was 
not hearsay. The printout contained a calculation by a machine and 
it was not a statement. The court drew a distinction between informa- 
tion and calculations resulting from data fed into a computer. While 
a printout of the information would be hearsay, electronic calculations 
were not hearsay. The same result could be reached by treating the print- 
out as the basis of expert testimony. In Canada, using an out-of-court 
statement as the basis of expert testimony is a well-established non- 
hearsay use. 
(b) Exceptions to the hearsay rule 
The courts appear willing to modify the traditional common law excep- 
tions to the hearsay rule so as to admit computer printouts. In Ares 
v. Venner,lo in a unanimous judgment of Canada's highest court, 
Hall, J. quoted with approval the following passage to the effect that 
the common law rules of evidence must change to accommodate modern 
business practices: 
The common law is moulded by the judges and it is still their 
province to adapt it from time to time so as to make it serve 
the interests of those it binds. Particularly is this so in the 
field of procedural law. Here the question posed is - 'Shall 
the courts admit as evidence of a particular fact authentic 
and reliable records by which alone the fact may be satis- 
factorily proved?' I think the courts themselves are able to 
give an affirmative answer to that question." 
Similarly, the courts admit computer-generated evidence of bank- 
ing,12 bu~ ines s , ' ~  and public recordsI4 under the statutory exceptions 
to the hearsay rule in federal and provincial legislation. The definitions 
of "record" and "document" could be improved, but, as presently 
9 R. v. Wood (1982) 76 Cr. App. R. 23 (C.A.). 
10 (1970) 14D.L.R. (3d)4(S.C.C.) .  
11 Ibid., at p. 15. 
12 Supra, footnotes 2 ,  3 ,  and 6. 
13 R. v. Vanlerberghe (1978) 6 C.R. (3d 222 (B.C.C.A.). 
14 R. v .  Sanghi (1971) 6 C.C.C. (2d) 123 (N.S.S.C.-A.D.). 
worded, they seem to cover computer printouts. In addition to the 
provisions in Ken Chasse's paper, the Interpretation Act (British 
C o l ~ m b i a ) ' ~  defines a "record" as including 
books, documents, maps, drawings, photographs, letters, 
vouchers, papers and any other thing on which information 
is recorded or stored by any means whether graphic, elec- 
tronic, mechanical or otherwise. 
And Bill S-33, the proposed Canada Evidence Act, expressly includes 
a computer printout as a "record" under sections 2 and 130. 
2. Microfilm 
(a) Non-hearsay 
In British Columbia, R. v. Degelman16 shows the courts' eagerness to 
admit microfilm as non-hearsay. Mr. Degelman was charged with 
possession of stolen parts from a Chevrolet Corvette. The prosecutor 
called a witness from the provincial Motor Vehicles Branch who testi- 
fied that he had searched the microfilm records and according to them 
the parts belonged to a Mr. Huffman. The witness also testified that 
there was a discrepancy in the record. The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal held the testimony admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of 
showing the state of the records. Also it held that the jury could draw 
the inference that Mr. Huffman owned the parts. The jury drew that 
inference and convicted Mr. Degelman. In my opinion, the Court of 
Appeal was too accommodating: the prosecution should have been 
required to introduce the microfilm record or an authenticated copy, 
not merely a government official who testified as to what it said. In 
the interests of a fair trial, Mr. Degelman should have been allowed 
to challenge the accuracy of the record more effectively. The case 
graphically illustrates the dangers of shortcutting the rules of admissi- 
bility and leaving the admissibility of computer records to  the so-called 
experts in computer technology and records management. In this case, 
both the hearsay rule and the best evidence rule were trampled. The 
hearsay and best evidence rules are crucial to a fair trial. Kenneth 
Chasse's suggestion that the admissibility of computer records should 
be a matter for professional records managers and is beyond the capacity 
of the hearsay rule would be a step in the wrong direction. If it were 
the law, many more cases like Degelman would be the result. 
(b) Hearsay 
The courts presently admit microfilmed banking, business, and public 
records under the statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule. In R. v. Biasi, 
Paris, J., of the British Columbia Supreme Court, admitted photostat 
copies within the definition of business record: 
Some of the business line cards, it is pointed out, are in fact 
photostat copies of some other records, and it is said there- 
15 interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, C. 206, S. 29. 
16 (1977) 2 C.R. (3d) 1 (B.C.C.A.). 
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fore that our affidavit pursuant to s. 30(3) of the Canada 
Evidence Act, explaining the absence of the original, should 
have accompanied the documents. However, Mr. Funk 
testified that those cards tendered were in fact used by B.C. 
Telephone Company as their original records, the actual 
originals having for some reason been disposed of. In my 
view, the definition of 'record' in s. 30 is broad enough to 
encompass such documents as it is defined as including any 
document in which information is 'written, recorded, stored 
or reproduced.' Therefore, the documents tendered are B.C. 
Tel's 'original' (as distinct from copies under s.s. (3)) for 
the purposes of this section. I further have no doubt that 
the records whenever made were made in the usual and ordi- 
nary course of business of the company.17 
Therefore, as long as a witness can account to the court for the absence 
of the original document - by establishing that it was made and 
destroyed in the ordinary course of business, that the microfilm or 
photostat was made in the ordinary course of business according to 
an accurate and reliable system, and that the microfilm or photostat 
is used in the business - it is admissible as an original business record. 
(3) Archives 
(a) Authentication and the best evidence rule 
Federal and provincial statutes greatly facilitate the admissibility of 
archival records. They provide that a certified copy of any original docu- 
ment satisfies the requirements of authentication and the best evidence 
rule. For example, section 7 of the Archives Act of 0ntario18 provides 
as follows: 
A copy of any original document in the custody of the 
Archivist, certified under his hand and seal to be a true copy, 
is prima facie evidence of authority and correctness of such 
document. 
The courts presume that the purported signature and seal of a public 
official is authentic. They also take a very liberal approach to the proper 
form of attestation required. If the document is not attested by the 
Archivist personally, but by someone on his behalf, the courts will rely 
on other applicable statutory provisions to uphold the formal validity 
of the certification." 
(b) Hearsay 
As Mark Hopkins points out, federal and provincial archives are public 
records and can qualify for admissibility under common law and statu- 
tory exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
17 Supra, footnote 6, at p. 306 (C.C.C.). 
18 R.S.O. 1970 c. 27; Public Archives Act ,  R.S.C. 1970 c.  P-27 s. 9. 
19 R. v .  John & Murray Motors Ltd. (1979) 8 C.R. (3d) 80 (B.C.C.A.). 
At common law,20 the exception to the hearsay rule for public 
records required that the contents be relevant to a public matter, that 
the record be made by a public officer acting under a public duty to 
make the record, that the record must have been made to be retained 
and kept as a record, and that the record must be open to public inspec- 
tion. Live testimony would be necessary to establish these elements. 
Since the common law requirements are extremely onerous, the more 
practical course is to use one of the statutory exceptions to the hearsay 
rule for the admissibility of public records. Under such provisions as 
section 26 of the Canada Evidence Act and section 36 of the British 
Columbia Evidence Act, the foundation for admissibility can be estab- 
lished by the archivist's affidavit. 
Authentication, best evidence, and hearsay can all be disposed of 
by certificate and affidavit. The archivist's testimony should not 
ordinarily be necessary to establish the admissibility of archives. 
11. Records keepers testifying in court 
A records keeper may be called upon to testify in court on two issues: admissi- 
bility and weight. Admissibility is a question for the judge to decide. There- 
fore, the records keeper may testify to the judge concerning admissibility. 
Secondly, if the record is ruled admissible, a records keeper may also testify 
as to its weight. In a trial by jury, weight is a question of fact for the jury to 
determine. In a trial by judge without a jury, the same judge decides admissi- 
bility and weight, but is expected to do so as if he or she were exercising two 
independent and separate roles. Even in a trial by judge alone, admissibility 
and weight are kept separate. 
However, there is in practice a considerable overlap between authentication, 
which is an aspect of admissibility, and weight. For instance, evidence of a record 
keeper as to  the reliability of the computer and the system which produced the 
printout is crucial to its admissibility and to its weight. Kenneth Chasse's 
proposal that the legislatures enact checklists of factors for the judge to consider 
in determining authenticity creates a risk to the efficient administration of justice, 
particularly in jury trials. The same evidence will be given twice: once to the 
judge in the absence of the jury and then to the jury. The judge's inquiry 
into authenticity could become a prolonged inquiry into such complex issues 
as whether a particular computer system measured up to industry standards. 
Canadian judges, with an eye to the protracted and chaotic trial administration 
so prevalent in the United States, would oppose such a change. The Supreme 
Court of Canada has spoken out against the elaborate authentication of 
wiretaps.21 The following quotation from the Chief Justice of Ontario seems 
apt: 
20 Sturla v. Freccia (1880), 5 A.C. 623 (H.L.). 
21 Charette v. R. (1980) 14 C.R. (3d) 191 (S.C.C.). 
RECORDS AND ARCHIVES IN COURT 
By adopting such a procedure the trial is unduly prolonged, the jury 
is absent from the court-room too long, and the continuity of the 
trial which is so desirable is unduly disturbed. . . .22 
I would be concerned about the impact of the proposal on  efficient trial 
administration. 
Furthermore, the uses to which computers may be put and the technology 
are changing all the time. Kenneth Chasse points out inconsistencies in the 
reasons for judgment in different cases. The reason for these inconsistencies 
is that no two cases are the same; each case has unique factual issues. The enact- 
ment of generalized criteria for admissibility will not solve this problem because 
specific facts will lead to inconsistencies in the application of the criteria. 
Finally, Kenneth Chasse's proposal to establish standards for the qualifica- 
tion of records managers as expert witnesses goes far beyond the present require- 
ments of the law of evidence. The qualification of a witness as an expert is much 
less demanding. In R. v. B u n n i ~ s , ~ ~  His Honour Judge Tyrwhitt-Drake of the 
British Columbia County Court, said: 
The test of expertness, so far as the law of evidence is concerned, 
is skill, and skill alone, in the field in which it is sought to have the 
witness's opinion. If the court is satisfied that the witness is suffi- 
ciently skilled in this respect for his opinion to be received, then his 
opinion is admissible. 
He defined an expert as: 
. . .one who has, by dint of training and practice, acquired a good 
knowledge of the science or art concerning which his opinion is 
sought, and the practical ability to use his judgment in that 
science.24 
This is the standard presently used by the courts to decide whether a witness 
qualifies as an expert. The proposal to raise this standard for records managers 
would have the effect of excluding many highly qualified individuals from testify- 
ing as experts, even though their testimony would be useful and all that the 
courts would require. The proposal seems objectionable on the grounds that 
it would deprive the courts of useful testimony and would be expensive for 
litigants. 
In conclusion, I would contend that Kenneth Chasse presents too bleak a 
picture of the present state of the law of evidence. In doing so, he invites 
Macaulay's famous retort: "Reform? Sir, do not speak to me of reform; things 
are bad enough as they are." 
22 R. v. Dietrich (1970), 1 C.C.C. (2d) 49, at p. 62. 
23 R. v .  Bunniss (1964), 50 W.W.R. (N.S.) 422, at p. 424. 
24 Ibid., p. 425. 
